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WILLS AND TRUSTS
I. I RNTODUCTION
Only three cases of any significance were decided under this
classification, all in the area of wills and intestate succession.
Two of these cases1 merely restated the present law of South
Carolina. The third2 tended to muddy the water on what was
previously settled law. There were no significant cases in the
area of trusts.
II. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Porter V. Seott3 was an action for partition of real estate. The
lower court, after deciding the plaintiffs were the children of a
woman who lived in illicit cohabitation with the intestate land
owner Amos Salters and were therefore not Amos' heirs and
could not demand partition, held that Marie Scott was the sole
owner of the property. However, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed this holding in part, because of evidence point-
ing to the fact that Amos had married again after the death
of his first wife. The second wife was Carrie Brownfield Salters.
Marie was the daughter of Amos' deceased son Monroe, who
was the only child of Amos' first marriage. It appeared that
Amos had died in 1917, the same year he acquired the property.
Carrie died in 1931 or 1934, and no evidence was presented at
the trial as to the disposition of her share of the property. The
court decided, therefore, that Marie could not be held the sole
owner of the property, and until the questions surrounding
Carrie were settled no further disposition of the land could be
made. This decision did not in any way change present law. The
Statute of Descent and Distribution provides that when an
intestate leaves a spouse and one child surviving, the real prop-
erty shall be divided equally between them.4 Thus no determina-
tion could be finally made without information as to Carrie and
her heirs, if any.
1. Porter v. Scott, 154 S.E2d 679 (S.C. 1967) ; Norton v. Matthews, 249
S.C. 71, 152 S.E2d 680 (1967).
2. South Carolina Nat'1 Bank v. Copeland, 248 S.C. 203, 149 S.E2d 615
(1966).
3. 154 S.E2d 679 (S.C. 1967).
4. S.C. CODE Axn. § 19-52(1) (1962).
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IMT. CONTRACT TO MAIM A WILL
Norton v. Matthews5 was an action brought for specific per-
formance of an alleged oral contract to make a will. The plain-
tiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Norton, alleged that in the summer of 1960
Mr. Norton and the intestate, Ernest F. Matthews, had several
conversations leading to an oral contract that the Nortons would
provide nursing care and handle certain business affairs of the
intestate, and the intestate in return would devise his home tract
of land to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged they fully per-
formed the agreed services until December 29, 1961, when the
intestate entered the hospital. The intestate had executed a will
on August 3, 1961, devising the specified property to the plain-
tiffs. A dispute over nurses and Mr. Norton's method of account-
ing for money expended kindled a dispute, the results of which
were an end of the services and the destruction of the will. From
early January, 1962, there were no further contractual duties
performed.
The court found that the intestate had not made it impossible
for the plaintiffs to continue the services, and such was an
essential element if the plaintiffs were to be awarded specific per-
formance.( If impossibility of performance cannot be shown,
then complete performance is required.7 Furthermore, in a con-
tract of this nature the plaintiffs were required to exercise the
utmost patience should the intestate prove to be ill-tempered.8
Since the plaintiffs were unable to show complete performance
or impossibility of performance, regardless of the requirement
of clear, cogent and convincing evidence of the oral contract,9
their action failed. The decision merely restated the present law
in South Carolina.
IV. TmE DocTRnin OF FACTS OF INDEPENDENT SIGNm cANCE
The court in South Caroina Natona Bank v. CopelandA'
began by stating that an attesting witness to a will need not see
the attestation clause, and, further, need not know that the docu-
5. 249 S.C. 71, 152 S.E.2d 680 (1967).
6. Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E2d 889 (1944); Bruce v. Moon, 57
S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1899).
7. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E2d 367 (1949); Young v. Levy,
206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 899 (1944).
8. Flowers v. Roberts, 220 S.C. 110, 66 S.E2d 612 (1951).
9. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E.2d 367 (1949); Young v. Levy,
206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1944).
10. 248 S.C. 203, 149 S.E2d 615 (1966).
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ment is a will. However, the clarity of the court ended at this
point.
The testatrix had executed a will which was intended, and the
intention was clearly written out in the will, to incorporate cer-
tain provisions of her brother Robert's will into hers as if they
were written out in her will. However, the draftsman used this
erroneous language: "If at the time of my death my said brother
shall have died leaving a will, duty probated .... ."11 Thus the
brother's will could not be incorporated because the language
did not refer to the document as already in existence, a prerequi-
site to incorporation. 12 The issue on appeal, since there was no
incorporation by reference, was whether the gift could be up-
held as valid through use of the doctrine of facts of independent
significance. Courts use this doctrine to incorporate documents
that fail to fulfill the technical requirements of incorporation by
reference because of their unwillingness to allow frustration of
the testator's intentions. 13 Furthermore, the will of a third per-
son can be used because the requirement of attestation by wit-
nesses serves as a sufficient guarantee against fraud.14
The South Carolina Supreme Court did not accept the prop-
osition that the will could be sustained under the doctrine of
facts of independent significance. The court, through hazy rea-
soning, seemed to state that the doctrine could be used when the
language reads "according to the terms and conditions of the
will of my said husband,' 15 but not when the will uses the added
language found in the testatrix's will "as if the language in my
said brother's will... were copied at length herein with appro-
priate changes to make them a part of my will."16 Incorporation
by reference must be used to the exclusion of facts of independent
significance. Where, with the former language, the court could
ignore the failure of the attempted incorporation by reference
and validate the gift by utilizing the doctrine of facts of inde-
pendent significance, in the Copeland case simply because
"this intention was frustrated [did] not justify a construc-
11. South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, 248 S.C. 203, 214, 149 S.E2d
615, 618 (1967) (emphasis added).
12. T. AT INSON, WiuLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953).
13. See Comment, 18 S.C.L. Ry. 683 (1966).
14. RESTATEMENT OF PROPMRTY § 34(f) (1940).
15. In re Gregory's Estate, 70 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 1954). This case was
referred to by the court as one of many cases setting out the doctrine of facts
of independent significance, but was distinguished by its "different" language.
16. South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, 248 S.C. 203, 215, 149 S.E.2d
615, 619 (1966).
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tion . . . which [was] opposed to the ordinary meaning of the
words used."1 7 A draftsman would be well-advised to omit such
language, because if the incorporation by reference fails and
such language is present, Copeland seems to say that the doctrine
of facts of independent significance will not be used to sustain
the validity of the gift.'
Roy L. Fmam
17. Id. at 215-16, 149 S.E.2d at 619.
18. Copeland is thoroughly discussed in Comment, 18 S.C.L. Rsv. 683- (1966).
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